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Abstract—This position paper presents a new approach to
infrastructure sharing for mobile networks based on the idea
that network resources, both at the wireless access and the core
network, can be traded dynamically on a real-time market where
virtual operators or tenants compete to obtain the resources to
serve their users. The negotiation procedure can be automated by
allowing tenants to define their policies, objectives and constraints
and designing a pricing approach that can guarantee fairness.
Moreover, the whole system can be made controllable by a
regulation authority that can use global constraints and pricing
policies in order to guarantee fair competition, social benefits,
and a level of revenues for the infrastructure providers able to
guarantee capacity expansion and technology update.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile networking industry is fast moving towards fifth
generation technology (5G) and already starting research on
beyond 5G evolution. Even if enhanced version of mobile
broadband (eMBB) services will continue to be an important
pillar of operators offer, the new application domains of mas-
sive machine type communications (mMTC) and ultra-reliable
and low latency communications (URLLC) are expected to
play an important role [1].
Unfortunately, technological evolution of mobile networks
and the fast growth of traffic volume require large infrastruc-
ture investments and place an enormous strain on the already
decreasing profitability of mobile operators [2]. Hence, it is
common belief that the introduction of 5G will mark also a
change in the business modus operandi of mobile operators.
Some of the novelties being introduced in the architecture of
mobile networks can be instrumental to this business change.
In particular, the concepts of network function virtualization
and network slicing allow operators to optimize the usage of
resources and make their infrastructure more flexible to meet
the needs of the very diverse set of vertical applications that are
expected for next generation networks. Generally speaking, a
network slice is managed by a tenant and can be dedicated
to support a specific application with its own resources in
the different network segments (access, transport, and core)
and its chain of virtual functions and services. Specialized
network slices can extend the offer of operators to the end
users and also to other business entities that can act as tenants
and develop their own solutions.
As a matter of fact, it is easy to see network slicing as
a technical tool able to open up the mobile network to the
longly predicted evolution towards infrastructure sharing [3].
For operators, sharing a common infrastructure can potentially
reduce their capital and operational expenditures and allow
them to offer to their customers better prices, a larger number
of services, and a better quality of service. Sharing can be un-
dertaken at various levels, as indicated in the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report [3].
However, the most comprehensive method of sharing, known
as active sharing, consists of multiple mobile virtual network
operators (MVNOs) that lease or rent the infrastructure from
an infrastructure provider (InP). Service Level Agreements
(SLAs) regulate relations between the parties who intend to
share the infrastructure and they usually take the form of
contracts which are enforced over a long period of time.
The concept of tenant of network slices can clearly be
associated to that of MVNO assuming that the same operator
can manage several specialized slices to offer services to its
customers or even that general purpose slices are offered by
infrastructure providers and then further subdivided using a
layered structure of virtual resources. MVNOs can even rent
slices from different infrastructure providers according to the
most convenient options in different areas and combine them
together to define the service for its own users. Although
this scenario appears rather different from the current one,
it is reasonable to expect that both economic advantages and
regulatory forces may drive the system in this direction.
This type of active sharing, which obviously implies spec-
trum sharing, may not be particularly appealing if based on
today’s SLAs with long term contracts, since the MVNOs will
not have the ability to accommodate traffic fluctuations and
might often find themselves in scenarios where they risk to
be unable to cater services to their customers or forced to
rent more resources than needed to account for uncertainty.
Another risk is that the market value of resources offered by
infrastructure providers decreases and prevent them to gain
the money necessary for the system to evolve in terms of
technology and capacity.
We argue that the technological evolution of 5G provides
the opportunity to transform mobile networks into a resource
that can be flexibly partitioned and traded on short time scales,
a few seconds or minutes, as already done for other network
based resources such as electricity or natural gas. In order
for such a system to work, viz. for it to be profitable for
all the parties involved, each of them should have a good
understanding of their own budgets, the implications of short-
term fluctuations on them, and an accurate estimate of their
traffic load and mix.
In this position paper, we present a new approach to
infrastructure sharing based on the idea that network resources,
both at the wireless access and the core network, can be traded
dynamically as in a real-time market. In particular, in Sec. II
we review the current state of the art in wireless sharing.
Afterwards, we highlight the technical and economical advan-
tages of long-term active sharing and show a first feasibility
assessment of the wireless market envisioned in Sec. III and
Sec. IV, respectively. Sec. V concludes the paper highlighting
the main open challenges.
II. STATE-OF-THE-ART IN WIRELESS SHARING
Historically, operators differentiated their offers to entice
new customers based primarily on coverage and capacity
guarantees. As explained in the Introduction, however, mobile
network operators – faced with an explosion in the types of
services expected to be catered to by wireless technologies
in the near future, the tightening constraints on spectrum
availability, and a sluggish growth in profits – have turned to
network sharing in order to reduce expenditure while adhering
to service guarantees. Driven by necessity, operators in differ-
ent countries started to engage in various forms of network
sharing based on their local regulations and individual service
assurances [3]. Furthermore, the OECD concluded in [3] that
network sharing is beneficial not only for helping operators
maintain their service guarantees and reduce expenditure, but
also for the overall health of the economy as a whole, since
sharing ensures the continued existence of a competitive and
diverse market (by making it harder for larger operators to
effectively monopolize the market).
There are four main types of sharing delineated in [3],
namely: passive sharing, e.g., sharing sites, masts, and an-
tennae; active sharing, e.g., radio access network (RAN)
sharing; core network sharing; and, network roaming. Since
network roaming has long been a mainstay of networks to
ensure users’ connectivity across geographic (mostly national)
boundaries and because core network sharing – usually pro-
vided as services to network operators by third party service
providers/vendors – is also widely practiced, research has
focused mostly on the first two categories, i.e., passive and
active sharing. As illustrated by the examples listed, passive
sharing is defined as the joint use of the space or the physical
infrastructure resulting in operators splitting the costs of the
power supply, air conditioning, lease of the sites, etc. Studies
such as [4]–[6] indicate a potential cost savings of 15%−25%
depending upon the deployment scenario (i.e., dense urban,
urban, sub-urban, or rural). Additionally, this type of sharing
poses very few technological difficulties and allows mobile
operators to retain complete autonomy over their own network.
However, the OECD report [3] – based on the analysis of
data from around 35 countries – states: “In general, savings
from active sharing are greater than for passive sharing as a
higher proportion of costs are shared”. Active sharing entails
sharing all radio access network equipment including the site,
mast, antenna, and backhaul. The company managing the site
typically leases the whole package to a network operator and
also carries data to their core network. This method, though
financially more lucrative, is technologically quite difficult to
implement and – perhaps more importantly – restricts the
autonomy mobile operators have over their networks.
Since resolving these issues simultaneously is quite difficult,
works usually tend to handle them one at a time. Recent
papers such as [7]–[10] focus on the technical aspects required
to facilitate active sharing. E.g., the authors of [9] provide
a generic (technology agnostic) method to efficiently utilize
hardware as well as spectrum. A potential solution to the issue
of operator autonomy (while using active sharing) is consid-
ered to be network slicing, [11]. The basic idea comprises
of the creation of a network slice, which is a customizable,
dedicated, logical (and – in most cases – virtual) entity capable
of functioning like an independent network though a common
physical infrastructure is in use. Based on this concept, works
such as [12]–[16] provide dynamic approaches to slicing in
which dedicated resources can be allocated to various services
depending on their requirements.
At first glance, from the description above, it appears that
the salient issues faced by active sharing have been mitigated.
A closer examination, however, reveals that a serious dis-
crepancy remains, namely: although the technical solutions
proposed take varying channel conditions and a fluctuating
traffic mix into account, the solutions – based mostly on
longterm service level agreements (SLAs), proposed for pro-
viding network operators their desired autonomy – do not.
This results in scenarios where operators often find themselves
facing a surfeit or paucity of network resources in their day-to-
day operations and therefore, being unable to make the most
of active sharing.
III. TECHNICAL AND ECONOMICAL ADVANTAGES OF
LONG-TERM ACTIVE SHARING
As clear from the overview on the related work in the
previous section, the answer to the question “is active sharing
worthy?” might not be unique, since the active sharing process
encompasses both technical, technology-specific issues, as
well as economical ones. The very same problem of assessing
the goodness/profitability of an active sharing process is a
research challenge per se, and we posit here the need of
comprehensive and consistent techno-economical frameworks
to do the job.
On the technical side, few elements should be defined to
clearly assess the validity of a specific sharing approach: (i)
the type of active sharing to be put in place (RAN sharing
with/without spectrum pooling), (ii) the quality perceived by
the end users in a shared network which, in turn, depends on
(iii) the specific scheduling strategies in the shared network.
On the economical side, the active sharing should account for:
(i) the current market share of the operators participating in the
sharing process, (ii) the expenses/costs to be sustained by the
operators and (iii) the effect of sharing on the revenues of the
MNOs, which is captured by a pricing model for the services
offered on the shared network. Moreover, active sharing might
be impacted by the presence/absence of a regulation authority
supervising and/or incentivizing the sharing process.
A first comprehensive framework to assess RAN sharing is
presented in our previous works [17,18] . The work analyzes
the strategic situation in which multiple MNOs have to decide
whether to invest in improving their pre-existing 3G network
by deploying LTE small cells in dense urban areas and whether
to share the investment (and the resulting Radio Access
Network) with other MNOs.
We tackle the sharing problem in two situations: a socially-
driven case in which a regulatory entity enforces sharing
policies to the MNOs to optimize the quality of service
perceived by the end users; in this case, we seek the sharing
configuration (the MNOs that share the network infrastructure)
that maximizes the end user achievable throughput, while
being sustainable by the MNOs (revenues at least equalize
the investment costs). Differently, in the market-driven case,
we capture the competitiveness of the MNOs and their profit-
maximizing nature by looking for the sharing configurations
that maximize the profit for the MNOs.
The two cases share common assumptions in terms of the
techno-economical characteristics. Namely
• each MNO has a given market share which is stable
over time, that is, the market share is not affected by
the sharing policy of the MNO;
• the cost of shared infrastructure including capex and
opex is shared among all the MNOs participating in the
sharing;
• the end users are characterized by a parameter capturing
the willingness to pay for getting an improved service;
the pricing model for the LTE service is linear in the
achievable rate by the end user, that is, the revenues for
the MNO grow linearly with the rate improvement in the
sharing infrastructure;
The socially-driven case is formalized in a mathematical
framework based on a MILP formulation to determine socially
optimal configurations to optimize the quality of service per-
ceived by all users; the market-driven is modeled by resorting
to cooperative game theory to determine stable coalitions of
MNOs willing to share the investment. The major results
obtained by applying the proposed framework to realistic
network settings can be listed as follows:
• the sharing configurations/policies are affected by the end
users willingness to pay for improved services and the
MNOs’ market shares;
• in the market-driven case, MNOs are better off building
a unique shared RAN than creating sub-coalitions or
building individual RANs due to the combined gain from
spectrum aggregation and cost reduction from sharing the
network infrastructure;
• in both cases (socially/market-driven), sharing is partic-
ularly appealing when users value service improvement
little; regardless of the MNOs market shares, this is the
case where the MNOs struggle with high investment
costs.
IV. TOWARDS A REAL-TIME MARKET OF WIRELESS
NETWORK RESOURCES
The proposed framework envisions the existence of a real-
time wireless market that is able to dynamically negotiate and
share resources (i.e., spectrum) with a very-fine granularity,
both in frequency and time, while guaranteeing profitability to
all parties involved. A first assessment of the feasibility of such
wireless market envisioned is carried out in [19] and [20], in
which we propose a first preliminary step towards more com-
prehensive techno-economic market models for radio access
networks. The main features that we include – detailed later
on in this section – are:
• real-time resource negotiation,
• possibility of service differentiation,
• capability of handling service heterogeneity,
• enabling future network expansion.
First of all, we considered two different types of stakehold-
ers, i.e., a single infrastructure provider (InP) and multiple
mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs). The former has
full power in deciding when and how to allocate wireless
resources as well as controlling the pricing mechanisms. The
latter can make resource requests in real-time and decide
whether or not to buy resources based on their own Quality-
of-Service (QoS) target and budget.
To accommodate the need for fast re-negotiations of re-
sources, the wireless market should be able to work in real-
time and to make decisions on a very short time scale (i.e.,
seconds, minutes). As proposed in [19], the service level
agreements (SLAs), e.g., in terms of sharing parameters, are
then directly mapped into the resource allocation algorithms
in such a way that they are able to incorporate both long term
MVNOs’ expectations and real time traffic fluctuations. In this
regard, the SLAs between the different parties should reflect
the willingness of the MVNOs to buy resources and their flexi-
bility in sharing them. For this reason, we envision a long term
sharing ratio, able to reflect the amount of resources needed
(hence requested and possibly used) on the long run and a
short term deviation, which allows both the MVNOs to trade
unused resources and the InP to fully exploit the flexibility and
improve the scheduling efficiency. To this extent, [19] proposes
an optimization framework which is able to maximize the
quality achieved by the MVNOs while preserving fairness and
satisfying budget requirements. Renegotiation of the sharing
parameters is also included to adapt to traffic fluctuations and
changing in service requirements.
Furthermore, the willingness of MVNOs to share should
not prevent them from the possibility of differentiating. For
instance, MVNOs should still be able to provide different
services, or the same service but with different quality levels.
As suggested in [20], MVNOs can compete and dynamically
select the quality target to deliver to their customers, while
simultaneously seeking to maximize their profits. Namely,
we introduce a quality parameter that can be selected by
each MVNO autonomously and determines the level that the
MVNO decides to provide to its users for the required service.
Fig. 1: Wireless Resource Market.
This allows MVNOs to apply quality diversification in the
services delivered to their customers. In [20], competition is
modeled by using a non-cooperative game, wherein the Nash
Equilibria show the propensity of operators to meet their users’
requirements.
Moreover, the introduced ecosystem and new functionalities
will also be able to support service heterogeneity. Namely,
network slicing and the use of dedicated resources for different
services is beneficial for achieving the service guarantees
required by the large variety of applications foreseen in future
networks. To incorporate slicing functionalities within our
framework, the wireless market should be able to determine
the size of the network resource slices required for various
active services, but it should also adapt prices accordingly.
Finally, as mentioned above, pricing mechanisms should
automatically adapt the cost of resources and the price paid by
each MVNO in such a way that they are proportional to what
is requested and what is actually used. The cost of resources
should be market driven, and prices and budgets must be
directly incorporated into the short term trading operated by
the wireless market. Furthermore, the InP should also be able
to continuously collect revenue for network expansion. For this
reason, we introduced in [19,20] the notion of “pressure cost”.
Namely, the pressure cost ensures that the costs of network
resources as well as future expansion scale according to the
MVNOs’ demand.
V. TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC CHALLENGES
In conclusion, we have discussed in this paper a new ap-
proach to infrastructure sharing based on the idea of a real-time
market of wireless resources with dynamic network slicing
and sharing. Based on our previous work, we presented a first
feasibility assessment which shows the main functionalities
envisioned and how those can be modeled and realized.
At the same time, several open points still need to be
addressed to make the proposed wireless market a reality.
In our opinion, the most interesting technical challenges that
point to possible research directions are the following:
• A clear strategy definition should be available to virtual
operators (or tenants) to allow them to play in their own
best interests while also taking into account prediction
information of the upcoming traffic mix as well as users’
channel conditions – elements which are critical to, e.g.,
adjust the slice assignments and sharing agreements.
• Pricing models play a critical role in the market, as well
as the fairness guarantees that must be ensured by the in-
frastructure provider. Different behaviors can be induced
changing pricing or resource allocation strategies, for
instance considering different time scales in the market
(similarly to the case of energy) and privileging operators
able to accurately predict traffic and buy resources in
advance.
• The critical role played by the regulation authority re-
quires the definition of its responsibilities and interactions
with the wireless market. These can take the form of
constraints on the strategies of operators and infrastruc-
ture providers and on the price composition that should
for instance ensure that sufficient economic resources
are injected in the system to guarantee its evolution and
ability to support traffic and applications.
An overview of the scenario envisioned is presented in
Figure 1.
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